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Abstract 
This article explores some important aspects of how Max Scheler conceived of the relationship between 
persons and actions. The primary source to do so is Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics 
of Values, but it will also be observed that the concept of the person as an act-accomplishing being figures 
as a leitmotiv in Scheler’s entire oeuvre: from the writings on sympathy and love to the late writings in 
which Scheler developed his controversial metaphysics. 
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1. Introduction 
Max Scheler’s philosophical magnum opus – Formalism in Ethics – is an attempt to elaborate the 
philosophical foundations of ethical personalism. Personalism is a term that is rather difficult to define 
very precisely, and there is a wide range of philosophers that have been called personalists. Albeit that the 
term personalism – which goes back to Friedrich Schleiermacher – seems itself sometimes too broad, it is 
a fact that in the first half of the twentieth century, several thinkers – often Christian thinkers indeed – 
focussed on the concept of the person in their writings, and that these thinkers considered themselves (or 
were seen by others) as personalists.  
It was not merely a concern for the human person that linked these thinkers, but similar views on 
individualism and modern society, freedom as a positive concept (which often entailed fiery critiques of 
negative freedom), intersubjectivity and love. These are some of the topics around which thinkers like 
Berdjaev, Marcel, Mounier, Maritain, Scheler, Wojtyła and several others elaborated their thought. 
A keen interest in the human (and especially) moral act is another one of these connecting threads 
between the above-mentioned philosophers. An increased interest in the subject of the human/moral act 
could be noticed in the first half of the 20
th
 century, and especially among philosophers who also made the 
concept of the human person central in their ethics. To underpin this thesis one only needs to take a quick 
look at Berdjaev’s The Meaning of Creation and his concept of tvorčestvo (moral creativity), to Blondel’s 
L‟action, or the second chapter of Maritain’s Court Traité de l‟existence et de l‟existant. 
All these writings offer an analysis of human agency, which is closely interwoven with the topics of 
human freedom and personhood. Furthermore, it is important to notice that a following generation of 
philosophers, profoundly influenced by (some of) the above-mentioned early twentieth century thinkers 
(see Wojtyła’s The Acting Person or Vladimir Jankélévitch’s active philosophy and demanding ethics of 
permanent vigilance), equally emphasized the concept of the human/moral act in their ethics (Wojtyła 
adopted the Thomistic term actus humanus to denote this concept, a term which indeed qualifies well to 
describe this concept). 
A similar interest in the phenomenon of the human act is also one of the salient features of Max 
Scheler’s ethics, and of his philosophy in general. It has often been said that Scheler was a rather 
impulsive and inconsistent thinker, a view which was especially nurtured by the fact that Scheler had 
abandoned Catholicism in his later writings in order to develop an anthropocentric concept of 
Gottwerdung (with an emphasis on the becoming rather than on the being of God) which seems 
incompatible with the concept of God that traditionally features in Catholicism. However, Scheler never 
seemed disloyal to his ethical beliefs, and in all of his writings a similar concept of the person and human 
agency – the person as an act-accomplishing being – occupies a distinct and central place.1 
2. Persons and Moral Values 
2.1. Persons and Acts 
Scheler’s concept of the person is highly complex and cannot be entirely explained within the framework 
of a single article. I will therefore focus on one salient feature of that concept, namely the intrinsic 
relationship between personhood and action. It is evident that this is only one aspect – though a most 
crucial one – of Scheler’s concept of the person. Of equal importance is for example Scheler’s concept of 
ordo amoris, without which little meaningful can be said about Scheler’s concept of the person. A 
recurrent theme in Scheler’s thought and writings is that human persons are not the rational beings Kant 
thought they were. Man is not a rational animal or a Vernunftswesen, but an ens amans. ‘Man is – before 
being an ens cogitans or an ens volens – an ens amans.’2 
This implies that what a man does, thinks and wants is determined by the spectrum of what he loves and 
hates, and consequently, that a person and his moral worth are equally determined by this spectrum, which 
Scheler calls the ordo amoris. Heinz Leonardy nicely summarized the immense importance of the ordo 
amoris in Scheler’s concept of the person: ‘The actual essence of the person, that which makes the person 
being a person […] is the ordo amoris.’3 
Though I shall not extensively discuss the ordo amoris (its normative and descriptive meaning) 
throughout this article, it has to be emphasized that the way in which Scheler conceived of the relationship 
between persons and acts is also determined by his views on love and the ordo amoris. In many of his 
writings Scheler analyzes how love is a dynamic force of human agency. Love is motion rather than 
emotion, it increases our insight in how we can do good or evil, and can motivate us to pursue the former 
rather than the latter.
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Love fundamentally determines the acts we perform, and it is not only the fact that we love, but also that 
we act which makes the person being a person. ‘A person acts [and] it belongs to the essence of the person 
that he only exists and lives in the performance of intentional acts.’5 
The question is then of course whether the person constitutes acts or whether the acts constitute the 
person. That is the apparently simple but highly complex question around which Scheler develops his 
concept of the person as an Aktussein (a dynamic synthesis of the being and the acting of the person). 
According to Scheler, the person is not the necessary or causal correlate of human activity, rather the 
person is the unifying principle that encompasses the entirety of this activity, and of which the person is 
also the driving force. Furthermore, persons are themselves modified and determined by these acts.
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This concept of the human person is ‘the happy medium […] between a (static) substantialism and an 
exclusively dynamic actualism.’7 The person constitutes all human acts in which it is always entirely 
involved. Similarly these acts constitute the person, without the person being merely a mosaic of acts, and 
the person entirely coinciding with the acts he performs, and of which he would thus be nothing but the 
sum. 
This view – as opposed to some recent and popular theories (some of which being influenced by Eastern 
spirituality) which deny that there is such a thing as a person or a core from which human agency springs, 
but partly in line with other recent theories of the human person (eg. Richard Hallam too argues that the 
person really exists as an act-accomplishing foundational being, though he claims that the person is the 
origin and not the outcome of acts) – is determined by a mutual interaction and interdependence of 
persons and acts. The person constitutes acts, and yet these acts also determine the human person itself. 
‘The person is both the actor and the product of the act.’8 
The person is not a static thing or subject, the passive outcome of the acts man performs, neither do 
these acts originate in a vacuous space without any coherence or consistency. This would entail the view 
that the being of a person is merely the succession of singular and independent actions, and rather a virtual 
reality than real existence, a view which Scheler explicitly rejected. Persons are not the empty starting 
point of acts, neither are they the mere coincidence of acts.
9 
Scheler’s conceptualization of the person as a unity of acts undoubtedly raises many questions that 
Scheler perhaps not fully answers. It has been objected for example by Stephen Schneck that the 
ontological question – if person’s are unities of acts, what exactly are these unities? – remains largely 
unanswered. ‘Scheler is perhaps over-much restrained in his answer’, as Schneck contends.10 Similarly, 
Philip Blosser objected that Scheler’s language about the person (as is his language about the ontological 
nature of values) is too ambiguous and characterized by prima facie inconsistencies.
11 
It is anyhow clear that according to Scheler persons are capable of performing acts (of which the 
complexity will be discussed in part three of this article), and by defining the ability to accomplish acts as 
a salient feature of the person, Scheler turns the human act itself into the centre and core of his ethics. Not 
only the being of the person is determined by human agency, also the being (or to be more precisely the 
realization) of moral values depends on human agency.
12
 ‘All good and evil necessarily depend on acts of 
realization.’13 
The person is an act-accomplishing being and it is through the accomplishment of acts that moral values 
are realized, and that persons manifest themselves as being good or evil. Scheler does not only elaborate 
this view in Formalism in Ethics; it constantly returns in many of his writings. In The Nature of Sympathy, 
Scheler includes a small chapter on personhood, love and moral values, but the overall significance of the 
concept of the person in Scheler’s theory of sympathy can hardly be overestimated. Schneck even claimed 
that Scheler never dealt more rigorously and carefully  with the ontogenetic and psychological aspects of 
personhood than in The Nature of Sympathy.
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Though it still seems that Scheler more extensively elaborated his concept of the person in Formalism in 
Ethics (which Scheler himself also stresses in The Nature of Sympathy), it is a fact that many aspects of 
Scheler’s ethical system, as elaborated in Formalism in Ethics, are incorporated in Scheler’s theory of 
sympathy, so that Scheler’s psychological, phenomenological and ethical observations are closely 
interwoven with each other.
15
 As regards the concept of the person, it is relevant to notice that Scheler 
again maintains that the person is not a static object or thing, but the individually experienced 
Einheitsubstanz (substantial unity) of all acts, acts which the person accomplishes.
16 
In the late writings too, the concept of the person as an act-accomplishing being is of great importance. 
In Scheler’s late metaphysics Scheler again emphasizes that the person is the locus of morality, but it is 
not merely the being (again: the realization) of moral values that depends on the human person and his 
acts, but also the being (or realization) of God. The following description of the person could have easily 
fitted in Formalism in Ethics, still it is an important fragment of The Place of Man in the Cosmos: ‘The 
person is […] a structured constellation of acts, which ceaselessly brings itself forth. The person exists 
only in and through his acts.’17 
2.2. Good and Evil as Values of the Person 
In Scheler’s thought, the good is not a static object of desire or preference, but a value which belongs 
(originally) to the person, depending on the person’s concrete acting and how values are realized through 
those acts. It is the latter which I shall now briefly try to clarify, i.e. the relationship between moral values 
and the human person in Scheler’s ethics. 
In both the third and sixth chapter of Formalism in Ethics Scheler extensively analyzes the (moral) 
meaning of man’s ability to perform acts, while it appears as a crucial concept in many of the other 
chapters as well. Formalism in Ethics is such a complex piece of thinking, that it is impossible to grasp 
and represent its essence in a few simple lines. Perhaps it could best be characterized as an attempt to 
elaborate an objective hierarchy of values, whilst fully recognizing the affective foundations of our moral 
agency.  
Formalism in Ethics presents a value theory in which an objective hierarchy of non-moral values is 
essential as regards the realization of moral values. This hierarchy consists of four types of values.
18
 The 
lowest of these non-moral values are the sensory values, based on feelings of agreeableness or 
uncomfortableness, pleasure or pain. The modality of the second kind of values is entirely different, since 
these values – vital or life values – cannot be reduced to that which is agreeable or useful. The vital values 
relate to vital feelings, and encompass that which we call noble and excellent or vulgar and bad (by which 
Scheler indicates that these values should not be confused with moral values, i.e. good and evil).  
At a higher level of the value hierarchy we find spiritual values, which differ from the vital values as 
they are detached from the sphere of the lived body and environment (health, sickness, strength, weakness, 
courage, cowardice, nobility, vulgarity). The spiritual values consist of aesthetic values (beauty or 
ugliness), values of justice (right or wrong), and values of truth cognition (true or false).
19
 The last value-
modality consists of the holy or unholy, which cannot be further defined. The only thing we can say about 
them is the way by which they are given to us; as absolute Materiale. By this Scheler intends to say that 
these values are absolute and independent of a) feeling states of happiness or unhappiness, and of b) 
material goods (of what people correctly or incorrectly hold as being holy or unholy).
20
 
Scheler distinguishes between higher and lower values and – at each echelon of the hierarchy – between 
positive and negative values (pleasure versus pain, beauty versus  ugliness, etc.). The peculiarity of 
Scheler’s value theory is of course that moral values are not included in his hierarchy of (non-moral) 
values, but that he makes use of this hierarchy to conceptualize moral values nonetheless. Non-moral 
values relate to each other in an objective hierarchy, and moral values – good and evil – depend on the 
ability to comprehend this internal relationship and rank among values and to pursue those values that are 
of a higher or positive kind. In other words, moral values come into being (are realized) through the 
person’s ability to will and pursue the realization of non-moral values of a higher or positive kind. 
The spectrum of non-moral values is thus of a constitutive kind as regards the realization of moral 
values. Moral values ride on the back of non-moral values, as Scheler says. Scheler not only maintains 
that the moral value of the good comes into being due to the act of preference in which a higher value (eg. 
education) is preferred to a lower value (wasting one’s money on luxury things at the expense of educating 
one’s children). He also adds that the good occurs when a positive value is willed, and at each echelon of 
the hierarchy of values such positive and negative values exist. This is put central in several axioms which 
are essential to Scheler’s ethics: good is the value that relates to the realization (grounded in the sphere of 
willing) of positive and high values, evil is the value that relates to the realization (grounded in the sphere 
of willing) of a negative or low value.
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Many critics have argued that such a value theory confronts us with a problem. Non-moral values can 
occur, it is objected, without them necessarily entailing a moral good. This critique has been repeatedly 
put forth by Philip Blosser, which Blosser attributes to Scheler’s alleged failure to fully conceptualize the 
distinction between moral and non-moral values. Blosser argues that the realization of non-moral values 
does not always require human preference, willing or agency. Nature is perfectly capable of creating 
beauty, but it would be rather absurd to say that nature for example is behaving in a morally good way 
when it offers us a beautiful sunrise; that it does good (moral value) when realizing a beautiful sunrise 
(non-moral value).
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The critique that the realization of non-moral values does not always require human agency – and that 
it would be incongruous to call nature morally corrupt or sublime, depending on its beauty – and that 
Scheler fails to acknowledge or explain this, is fundamentally incorrect. Scheler’s theory of values could 
never give way to such absurd claims about the moral nature of other beings than the human person. 
Moral values necessarily relate to the person, and there can be no moral values without the human person 
(the person’s will and agency). Hence Scheler would never say that the existence of positive non-moral 
values (eg. the beauty of a sunrise) itself intrinsically entails moral values. Moral values can only 
(originally) apply to the human person: 
What could rather be originally called ‘good’ and ‘evil’ [is] the ‘person’, the being of the person itself. [..] 
‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ are values of the person (Personwerte).23 
What is important in Scheler’s conceptualization of the relationship between moral values, human 
agency, and willing, is the explicit and intrinsic relation between doing and being, between the human act, 
the being of the person and the realization of moral values. As Schneck nicely observed: ‘Literally, it 
would appear, to be (in the sense of being a person) is to do.’24 And indeed to do is to realize (moral) 
values, or values of the person. In Scheler’s own words: ‘The value ‘good’ appears when we realize the 
higher, positive value’25 
As such, Scheler defines moral values in proportion to the realization or accomplishment of acts 
(Realisierung der Akte) by the person. ‘The value good is that value which sticks to the acts of realization; 
which realize a positive value (opposed to a negative value) within a higher value level.’26 The realization 
or accomplishment of acts, by the human person, is thus of great importance in Scheler’s ethics, as a 
consequence of which Scheler’s ethics indeed revolves around the concept of the person as an act-
accomplishing being. 
3. The Accomplishment of an Act 
3.1. Realizing a basic moral tenor 
Since Scheler considers the person’s ability to perform acts essential for the being of both the person and 
moral values, the evident question is then: what is it exactly to accomplish an act? Not everything man 
does, qualifies as an act. Scheler for example explicitly indicates that acts require intentionality, and 
sensory functions are therefore not to be understood as personal acts.
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Intentionality is however only one feature of the accomplishment of acts, and Scheler distinguishes 
between at least seven levels or aspects of accomplishing an act, which is particularly relevant regarding 
the realization of moral values. The question we are concerned with here is, in other words: what is 
precisely required for doing good and realizing moral values? The following aspects need to be 
distinguished
28
: 
1. The present situation and the object of the act.  
2. The content which has to be realized in the act. 
3. The willing of this content by the person. 
4. The capabilities and activities which move the person (towards the performance of the act), i.e. a 
willing-to-do (Tunwollen). 
5. The experiences and feelings that accompany this willing-to-do. 
6. The (experienced) realization or accomplishment of the content that was willed (performance). 
7. The experiences and feelings that accompany the content that has been realized.
29
    
What is particularly interesting, is that Scheler as such rejects any ethical theory in which the 
phenomenological complexity of the accomplishment of acts is simplified, and in which moral values 
(good and evil) solely depend on the intentions of a person. The entire act-accomplishing process that 
follows is of no importance in such ethics. As Wolfhart Henckmann correctly observed: ‘With this theory, 
Scheler opposes to the much simpler view, according to which an act only consists of the inner 
determination of the will.’30 
Indeed the rejection of such a Gesinnungsethik seems to be the broader purpose of this particular aspect 
of Scheler’s ethical theory. Scheler emphasizes that there can be no good acts without the basic moral 
tenor being good. The basic moral tenor determines all other and subsequent aspects of the act. But that is 
only a preliminary, though fundamental, condition of accomplishing (moral) acts, and it does not suffice 
itself for realizing (moral) values. 
That the other aspects of accomplishing an act, by which a person does good and is good (the good that 
is done, being a personal value), is made clear by Scheler through the example of a paralyzed man who 
witnesses how somebody drowns. He may experience the same will to rescue the person in need as any 
other man (who is able to swim), but he can never transform this will into an act, since his willing-to-do 
(Tunwollen) does not coalesce with an ability-to-do (Tunkönnen). It would be incorrect to say that the 
paralyzed man is morally corrupt for not rescuing the person in need, but equally it would be incorrect to 
say both the paralyzed man and the rescuer deserve equal moral praise.
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We can only speak of such (moral) values of the person if the basic tenor is realized in an accomplished 
act.
32
 A virtuous person is both willing and able to accomplish acts in which moral values are realized. We 
must therefore explicitly stress the importance of the concepts of Tunwollen and Tunkönnen in Scheler’s 
concept of the person and in his thought in general.
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3.2. Able Persons 
A person must be able to accomplish this complex process of acting. Further on in Formalism in Ethics, 
Scheler indicates that a moral person (by which he means: a person who is capable of performing acts 
which entail a moral value) must have specific capabilities, so that in a most strict sense not all people are 
persons (insofar as those who aren’t, lack the capabilities to perform acts): ‘Therefore, the place where the 
essence of the person first flares up, has to be sought only within a specific group of people, not in man in 
general.’34  
That probably sounds more controversial than Scheler intends. What he means to say is that the 
accomplishment of acts which entail moral values – and which are thus essential to the being of the person 
– is not an easy thing, and that it requires knowledge, maturity, and specific capabilities. A person must be 
sane, capable of understanding the unity of the acts he performs himself (identifying and taking 
responsibility for one’s own acts).35  
A person must also have a correct awareness of what he is exactly capable of. The things he wishes to 
pursue must be realistic, in the sense that it must be possible to pursue the willed content with one’s own 
acts. A child may be willing that the stars drop from the sky into its own hands, Scheler states, but this 
pure act of willing, cannot be the basis of an actual pursuit of the willed content. The creative, active 
realization of moral values always requires an actual willingness and ability to perform moral acts (again 
Tunwollen and Tunkönnen), and the moral elevation of man precisely depends on this synthesis between 
what one wills and what one is capable of. ‘The primary phenomenon that characterizes all spiritual 
maturing is a continuous involvement of the will into the sphere of acting (die Sphäre des 
“Tunlichen”).’36 
Without such a balanced awareness of what one is actually capable of, much of the person’s powers to 
accomplish an act – and to do good – will remain latent.   
Many powers sleep in man and will never be realized due to the fact that he lacks a correct awareness of his 
abilities (Könnensbewußtsein). […] Pedagogues have therefore correctly claimed that one has to focus on the 
enhancement of this awareness in pupils.
37
  
In short, a person must be able to transform his will into action, and that is only possible if he has a 
correct awareness of what he is capable of. If someone constantly pursues (or wills) things he cannot 
possibly accomplish, this will be detrimental to both the feelings and mental states of that person, and this 
will not be conducive to his willingness and ability to do good. If the gap between what one wishes for 
and what one does is too big, this will give way to negative feelings, resentment, hatred and eventually 
acts which don’t entail a positive or high value. Because of that, Scheler repeatedly stressed the 
importance of a correct Könnensbewußtsein, and emphasized the dangers of Ohnmacht (impotency, as 
Frings translated it in The Mind of Max Scheler): the inability to accomplish those positive acts in the 
pursuit of a willed content. Ohnmacht is the breeding ground of resentment, hatred and vice.  
In Scheler’s thought ‘virtue is the experienced power to be or to do something that ought to be or to be 
done.’38 Vice is the opposite: ‘The word vice springs from the impotency towards an ideal ought.’39 
3.3. Ohnmacht and resentment 
It is noteworthy that Scheler frequently morally rejects impotency, though this should not be all too 
surprising either. At the heart of his ethics stands the person as an act-accomplishing being. The 
accomplishment of acts which entail high or positive values is a very complex process, and impotency, 
simply put, disturbs this process. 
Only persons can do good, and they can only do good because they are able to act and to love. That is 
basically the core of Scheler’s concept of the person and of how he thought person’s capable of doing 
good. Impotency, however is a hindrance to these two crucial aspects of personhood, for hatred and 
inaction spring from impotency. Since his specific concept of the person is a constant leitmotiv in 
Scheler’s entire oeuvre, it is no surprise that the concept of impotency also appears in many of Scheler’s 
writings. 
In Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, Scheler recapitulates the view that there must be 
a balanced synthesis between Tunwollen and Tunkönnen. Hatred is always a consequence of a lack of such 
an equilibrium: a conflict between reality (faktische Realität) and the object of the will which turns out to 
be a mere fantasy. The experience of this inability gives way to hatred, while hatred itself is an obstacle in 
the accomplishment of (good) acts.
40
  
In Ordo amoris too Scheler observes that the inability to transform one’s will into action, is the primary 
source of hatred and resentment. This inability (again called Ohnmacht or impotency) leads to a désordre 
du coeur: the ordo amoris as the core of the person is affected by this, and therefore also the core of the 
person as an act-accomplishing being. The person’s ability to do good is thus hampered by this 
phenomenon.
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The problem of impotency is indeed a severe moral problem. In his theory of resentment, Scheler 
elaborates this view more thoroughly, and explicitly links the problem of resentment to that of moral 
indolence and impotency. The inability to act and react is the primal breeding ground of resentment. 
Secondary origins of resentment, like vengeance, jealousy and envy, can only give way to resentment 
from the moment man is unable to transform his (negative) feelings into (positive) action. 
Feelings of revenge, envy, jealousy, malice, malicious delight and malevolence first appear in the formation of 
resentment where no moral conquest (in the case of revenge for example real forgiveness), nor an act […] occur; 
and where those don’t occur because a manifest awareness of the impotency (Ohnmacht) hampers such an act or 
such an expression.
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Scheler believed that the rise of resentment was essential to the crisis of his times, due to which his 
Kulturkritik of man, politics and society was essentially a moral critique. According to Scheler, man, in 
the first half of the twentieth century, lived in times of resentment which was stimulated by the specific 
structure of modern society.
43
  
The reasons for this are to be sought in the discrepancy between a merely formal (juridical) equality, and 
the major inequalities in actual access to power, property and education. Furthermore, Scheler believed 
that the democratic political system itself was defective and infected with resentment at all echelons. 
In Man in an Era of Adjustment, Scheler also maintains that politics should be concerned with the moral 
elevation of man. Political means ought to be applied in such a way that they stimulate and guide (Scheler 
uses the words leiten und lenken) a change of heart, a Wertsteigerung (rise of values) of man, which is 
necessary to overcome the crisis of interwar Europe.
44 
The rise of resentment however obstructs this rise of values. Moreover, Scheler identified this crisis as a 
moral crisis, because the rise of resentment is essentially synonymous with the moral downfall of society: 
hatred, resentment, and indeed impotency lead to a distortion of values, instead of a Wertsteigerung. 
Resentment is a moral disease, a moral self-poisoning and embitterment of human personality.
45
 It leads to 
a counterfeit of value images (Fälschen des Wertbildes), a forgery and a subversion of the value 
hierarchy.
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It has already been observed previously in this article that according to Scheler, love increases our 
insight in the value hierarchy. Due to hatred and resentment, that insight decreases. The realization of 
moral values depends on the person as an ens amans and an act-accomplishing being. That is a leitmotiv 
in many of Scheler’s writings, and it should therefore not surprise us that Scheler also deals in many of 
these writings with the opposite of love and acting, namely hatred (and also resentment) and impotency, 
which are always tathemmend (hindering positive action).
47
  
4. Conclusion 
This article has sought to explore some features of the way in which persons, acts and moral values relate 
to each other in Scheler’s ethical theory. The first part of this article mainly focused on how Scheler, in 
several of his writings, defined the ability to perform acts as a salient feature of both the person and the 
realization of values of the person (good and evil as Personwerte). The elaboration of this concept of the 
person is strongly connected with Scheler’s value hierarchy, and thus of immense importance in Scheler’s 
ethical theory in general. 
The second part of this article explored the phenomenological complexity of acting. Such a further 
exploration was indispensible in order to come to a better understanding of Scheler’s concept of the 
person. If one says that a person is an act-accomplishing being, and that moral values are realized through 
the person’s acts, it has to be made clear what the process of acting exactly involves. This also allowed us 
to consider more thoroughly the concepts of Tunwollen and Tunkönnen, and the concept of Ohnmacht.  
Scheler’s concept of the person is essentially about the ability and the power of man to perform acts. A 
good person has both the will and the power to accomplish acts which entail positive or higher values, 
whereas a lack of this power appears to be a serious moral problem. It might be clear now why Scheler 
repeatedly links Ohnmacht to hatred, resentment, and vice. Good persons are able, loving persons, whose 
acts are not inspired by resentment or hatred, but by love and a correct insight in the objective hierarchy of 
values. 
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